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Faculty and Deans

FIRST PARENTS: RECONCEPTUALIZING NEWBORN
ADOPTION
JAMES G. DWYER•

A small but significant percentage of newborn babies have biological
parents who are unwilling or unfit to raise them. 1 Some such birth parents
relinquish their legal rights to the baby so that other adults can adopt the
baby soon after birth. 2 In some other cases, a child protection agency
assumes custody of a baby at or soon after birth because the birth parents
abandon the baby or because the agency determines that the birth parents
are unfit to raise a child,3 and in a subset of these cases, a court terminates
the birth parents' rights and approves adoption of the babies by other
adults.4 In these two sets of cases involving newborns-what are now
called "parental placement adoptions" and "agency adoptions"5-the
adoptive parents are the only caretaking parents the children ever have and
for all intents and purposes raise the children just as do biological parents
who become legal parents.
Yet these lifetime caretakers forever bear the label "adoptive parents,"
a status with connotations different from "natural parent" or simply
"parent," terms used in state statutes to designate birth parents. 6 In part,
the connotations are positive. We might suppose adoptive parents must be
more competent and motivated to raise children, because they had to go
through an arduous qualification process to become parents. 7 Or we might

• Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law.
1
See James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States' Continued Consignment
ofBabies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REv. 407,424-27 (2008).
2
See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decision
Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM . & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 884 (2003).
3 /d.
4

See id. at 888.
/d. at 884 (citation omitted).
6
See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.01(A) (LexisNexis 2003) (defining "parent
and child relationship" as "the legal relationship that exists between a child and the child's
natural or adoptive parents").
7
Dwyer, supra note 2, at 882-83; see also Karen March, Perception of Adoption as
Social Stigma: Motivation for Search and Reunion, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 653, 656
(continued)
5
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view them as especially altruistic, because they give their love, attention,
and resources to a child who is not "their own."8 But the cultural
connotations are predominantly negative. Adoptive parents are widely
viewed as artificial rather than "real" parents, because "the dominant North
American family ideology defines a real family as the 'nuclear family unit
of a heterosexual couple and their biological children. "'9 Implicit in the
view that adoptive parents are altruistic is the assumption that the adopted
child is not the adoptive parents' "own child," but rather always remains
the child of the biological parents. 10 As such, they are only a second best
alternative for a child, incapable of being ideal parents no matter how
devoted they are. 11 And most people harbor doubt as to adoptive parents'
love of or connection to the children they raise because the children are not
their biological offspring. 12 In addition, because of the starkly different
legal treatment of biological parents and adoption applicants, "adopters
tend to experience the adoption process itself as problematic, intrusive, and

(1995) (noting survey result showing how some adoptees believed adoptive parents '"are
more loving and dedicated because, unlike most parents, they choose to have children"').
8
Cf Charlene E. Miall, The Stigma of Adoptive Parent Status: Perceptions of
Community Attitudes Toward Adoption and the Experience of Informal Social Sanctioning,
36 FAM. REL. 34, 37 (1987) (noting that adoptive parents are often told how kind it was of
them to take in someone else' s child).
9
Miall, supra note 8, at 35 ("As defined in North American society, the biological or
blood relationship among individuals forms the basis for kinship ties. Indeed, the blood tie
is conceptualized as indissoluable [sic] and of a mystical nature that transcends legal or
other kinship arrangements."); id. at 37; Katarina Wegar, Adoption, Family Ideology, and
Social Stigma: Bias in Community Attitudes, Adoption Research, and Practice, 49 FAM.
REL. 363, 363 (2000) (citation omitted); see also id. at 364 (noting "the dominant societal
beliefthat adoptive motherhood is inferior").
10
See Miall, supra note 8, at 37.
11
See Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. l 077, 1153
(2003); Wegar, supra note 9, at 364.
12
Cahn, supra note 11, at 1153 (citing a survey showing "only [seventy-five] percent
believed that adoptive parents love their children as much as they would have loved their
biological children"); March, supra note 7, at 654, 656--67; Miall, supra note 8, at 35
(stating that "a biological tie is often presented as a prerequisite to a loving relationship
with a child"); id. at 36 (noting adopters' perception that the public believes "bonding and
love in adoption are second best"); id. at 37; Wegar, supra note 9, at 364 (providing that
"because a biological tie is assumed to be important for bonding and love, adoptive families
are considered second best").
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humiliating." 13 That adoption applicants must undergo rigorous scrutiny, 14
whereas there is no examination of biological parents before they become
legal parents, 15 can convey the impression that adoptive parenting is
inherently suspect.
Correspondingly, being an adopted child carries a stigma. 16 This
stigma might today include some positive connotations. Some might think
an adopted child must have especially good caretakers, as noted above,
because adoptive parents are virtuous people whom an adoption agency
has investigated and interviewed. 17 Or some might think that the adopted
children must be especially charming or talented for people other than their
birth parents to choose them and commit to caring for them for many
years. 18
However, historically to a large degree, and perhaps more subtly today,
the adopted child stigma has carried negative connotations. Adopted
children are seen as coming from a defective biological line; their birth
parents either did not want them or were immoral and dysfunctional. 19
Adopted children are seen as damaged goods, presumed to have suffered
maltreatment after birth before being rescued and processed by the child
protective system, and therefore, likely to have lifelong struggles.20 This
presumption is accurate as to a substantial percentage of adoptees, because
the reality is that proactive child protective service (CPS) intervention at
birth to protect babies at high risk of maltreatment is rare,21 so children

13

Wegar, supra note 9, at 364; see also id. 366-67 (describing research showing that
adoption workers also stigmatize adoptive parents).
14
Cahn, supra note 11, at 1150; Dwyer, supra note 2, at 882-83.
15
Cahn, supra note 11, at 1150.
16
See Karen March, The Dilemma of Adoption Reunion: Establishing Open
Communication Between Adoptees and Their Birth Mothers, 46 FAM. REL. 99, 104 (1997).
17
See Cahn, supra note 11, at 1150; Dwyer, supra note 2, at 882-83.
18
Cf Paul Sachdev, Adoption Reunion and After: A Study of the Search Process and
Experience of Adoptees, 71 CHILD WELFARE 53, 60 (1992) (relating comments by adoptees
that "they were made to feel that they were 'chosen' and 'special"').
19
See March, supra note 7, at 656; Miall supra note 8, at 36 (referring to "the bad blood
theory''); id. at 37-38; Wegar, supra note 9, at 364.
20
See Cahn, supra note 11, at 1153; Miall, supra note 8, at 38; Wegar, supra note 9, at
363 (noting a study finding widespread doubt about the mental health of adoptees and
expectation that adoptees will have developmental and social problems).
21
Dwyer, supra note 1, at 441-52.
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who come into CPS custody for the most part do so only after already
having experienced abuse or neglect. 22 Adopted children also appear
atomistic, because they are disconnected from their extended biological
family and because we suspect their extended adoptive family keeps them
at arms length, never treating them as full or equal members of the
23
family.
They are persons with no real family. 24 Because of this
perception, adopted children are often uncomfortable revealing that they
25
were adopted.
This perception is a major reason why many adoptees
undertake a search for their birth parents: we communicate to them that
they are deficient, lacking something of great importance, and as a result,
they go to great lengths to try to become complete. 26
Thus, there are many families in our society in which the legal parents
are the only caretaking parents an adopted child has ever known,
functioning the same way and having the same needs as any other family,
and which are viewed by adoptees as their true family/ 7 yet which the law
and society label as not "real" or "natural," solely because the legal,
permanent, caretaking parents are not the adults who biologically produced

22

/d.

23

Apparently many in fact do. See March, supra note 7, at 657. But cf Miall, supra
note 8, at 36 (reporting that two-thirds of adopters interviewed said that close friends and
family viewed their adoptive parent-child relationships "as basically the same as biological
parenthood," while others said that family members tried to discourage them from
adopting).
24
See, e.g., March, supra note 7, at 657; Sachdev, supra note 18, at 59 (relating one
adoptee's experience of having spent her "whole life living a lie" and another's experience
of feeling she was not a "full person" until she knew her "roots").
25
See March, supra note 7, at 656.
26
See March, supra note 7, at 657-58; Wegar, supra note 9, at 364 (noting study
finding that "a main motivating factor for adoptees who search for unknown family
members was the wish to neutralize the stigma of adoption"). I emphasize that it is only a
partial explanation because I do not want to be mistaken for denying that connection to
biological parents is significant for children even in ways that are not socially constructed.
Evolution might well have hardwired humans to recognize and bond with biological
relatives, especially parents. Cf Sachdev, supra note 18, at 59 ("[1]he motivation behind
search is largely the adoptee's intense identity and genealogical needs.").
27
See March, supra note 7, at 656; March, supra note 16, at 102; Sachdev, supra note
18, at 63; Wegar, supra note 9, at 364 (citing research showing that adoptees perceived no
difference between their families and families based on biology).
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the child. 28 This labeling is detrimental for such children, as it undermines
their sense of self-worth/9 diminishes their parents' satisfaction and
confidence in child rearing, 30 and produces a pall of secrecy within
adoptive families concerning the child's biological origins that generates
"needless grief, pain, and fear" within those families. 31 All parents need
social support to carry out their responsibilities most effectively, and the
stigmatizing of adoptive families as deviant can make adoptive parents feel
they are doing something bad rather than supremely commendable? 2 In
addition, the stigmatizing might diminish the attractiveness of raising
children who are not one's biological offspring. Though there is no
shortage of adults in the United States today wanting to adopt newborns, 33
there would likely be an even larger surplus of applicants if the role were
treated and viewed as normal parenthood. This could have spillover
benefits for older children awaiting adoption, as to whom there is a
shortage of applicants in some communities. 34

28

See Miall, supra note 8, at 37; Wegar, supra note 9, at 367.
See March, supra note 7, at 656.
30
Wegar, supra note 9, at 366.
31
Sachdev, supra note 18, at 66.
32
See Miall, supra note 8, at 38; Wegar, supra note 9, at 368.
33
See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
29

FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADoPTION ALTERNATIVE 181 (1999) ("The potential pool of
adoptive parents is enormous-it dwarfs the pool of waiting children. About 1.2 million
women are infertile and 7 .l percent of married couples, or 2.1 million.") (footnote omitted);
Brian H. Bix, Perfectionist Policies in Family Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 1055, 1061 (2007)
(book review) ("[G]iven the current supply and demand for children for adoption, there is
every reason to believe that a baby given up immediately after birth would have no trouble
fmding a loving home.").
34
Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, II; see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: RECENT LEGISLATION HELPS STATES FOCUS ON FINDING
PERMANENT HOMES FOR CHILDREN, BUT LoNG-STANDING BARRIERS REMAIN, GA0-02-585
38 (2002) (noting that states are increasingly finding it difficult to find adoptive homes for
older children in foster care); Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the
Family's Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1716, 1745 (2000) (book
review) ("By the time the foster children are eligible for adoption-the time it will take to
exhaust reunification efforts and the time it will take for the courts to order terminationchildren will almost certainly be older than two years, and often considerably older. These
simply are not the children that these couples want to adopt."); Mark F. Testa, When

(continued)
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Therefore, whatever one might think about the moral correctness or
policy wisdom of birth parents' relinquishing their babies, or of the state's
taking custody of newborns against the birth parents' wishes, one could
accept that if these things are going to continue to occur, and if some
children are going to be raised from the outset by people other than their
biological parents, we might be able and obligated to do something to
avoid or ameliorate the detriment to these children from the stigmatizing of
non-biological parenting and families. Notably, there are cultures in the
world in which there is little or no stigmatizing of adoptive families, where
child rearing by non-biological parents is generally viewed as no different
from child rearing by biological parents. 35 This suggests that the
valorizing of biology and the subtle denigration of adoptive families is not
inevitable.
In two recent articles, I have advanced two types of arguments for
changing the way states make decisions about parentage at birth, in ways
that would result in many more children entering immediately after birth
into families with parents who are not their birth parents. First, I have
argued that the state should make a greater effort to identify at birth babies
whose birth parents are presumptively unfit, and as to those babies the state
should (a) immediately determine whether the parents are in fact fit or can
be made fit within six months, and, if not, then (b) immediately terminate
the birth parents legal relationship to the baby and place the baby with
adoptive parents. 36 That argument is aimed at securing better practical
outcomes within the existing basic statutory framework, under which the
state places newborns into legal relationships with birth parents without
regard to fitness, 37 and then, in cases of unfitness, later effects a
termination of parental rights and adoption if necessary to protect the
child's developmental interests? 8 Children then have two sets of legal
parents in succession, even ifthey only have one set of social or permanent

Children Cannot Return Home: Adoption and Guardianship, 14 FUTIJRE CHILD. 115, 119
(2004).
35
See Wegar, supra note 9, at 368 (discussing research showing non-stigmatizing
perceptions of informal adoptive families in African-American communities in the United
States and adoptive families in non-western countries).
36
Dwyer, supra note 1, at 467-91.
37
See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 859 & n.28, 869.
38
See id. at 954.
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caregiving parents. My proposal reflects the urgency to act immediately
after birth to get babies into permanent families, an urgency that stems
from the extreme vulnerability of newborns and from the crucial
importance for a child's development of forming a secure attachment
within the first year oflife to a permanent, competent caregiver. 39
Second, I have advanced moral and constitutional arguments for
changing the statutory parentage framework to establish a new basic
approach. I have argued that newborn babies have a moral right,40 and a
constitutional right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,41 against the state's placing them in the first instance into a
legal relationship with birth parents the state knows to be unfit. Thus, for
example, if the state terminates an adult's parental rights today as to one
child, because the adult severely abused the child and failed to respond to
rehabilitative efforts, and if the same adult gives birth to another child next
week, the state violates that new baby's fundamental rights by forcing him
or her ever to be the legal child of that adult, just as it would violate an
adult's fundamental rights by forcing her to marry a man known to be an
unrehabilitated spousal abuser.
Both arguments advocate reforms that would result in many more
newborn babies being available for legal family relationships with adults
other than their birth parents. The demand for newborns among adoption
applicants is high, 42 and the babies are likely to have a much better life if
raised by adoptive parents rather than unfit birth parents. 43 Newborn
children have a right to the state choosing that better life for them, just as
adults have a right to choose for themselves a spouse, from among all those
willing and available, with whom they think they can have the best
possible life.44
In this article, I propose reconceptualizing the legal process for
creating legal parent-child relationships at the time of birth, so that a
child's first permanent caretaking parents receive the same treatment and

39

See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 416-19.

40

JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CmLDREN 205-06 (2006).
James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and Newborn
Persons, 56 UCLA L. REv. 755 (forthcoming 2009).
42
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
43
See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 415-34.
44
See DWYER, supra note 40, at chs. 3-7.
41
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status regardless of whether they are also the child's biological parents. I
propose that parentage laws be reformed to eradicate tenns and concepts
such as "natural parent" and "adoptive parent" that embody dubious
normative assumptions and cultural biases that are detrimental to the
welfare of children and to the family life of biologically unrelated parents
and children.45 What we today know as rules of maternity and paternityterms that to many people connote precisely "legal parenthood based on
biological parenthood"-would be incorporated into a Law of First Parents
that confers initial legal parenthood on a child's first long-term caregivers,
whether or not those caregivers are biologically related. What we today
know as adoption rules would become the Law of New Parents, and they
would never apply to biologically unrelated parents who are a child's first
"real" parents in the sense of being caretakers who intend to be permanent
social parents (as opposed to foster parents or temporary guardians). In
Part I, I elaborate on the normative motivation for reconceptualizing
parentage. In Part II, I explain in some detail how a Law of First Parents
would operate and how it might differ, in its application to biologicallyunrelated caregivers, from current adoption laws.

I. THE FLAWED FOUNDATION OF THE CURRENT CONCEPTION
Two mistaken beliefs underwrite conventional attitudes and legal rules
relating to parentage. One is that the state is not involved in family
formation when biological parents become a newborn baby's legal
parents. 46 In that typical case, it is thought, the parent-child relationship
arises by nature pure and simple. After the fact, parents ask the state for
documentation of their parenthood, to facilitate school attendance, travel,
and so forth, but otherwise the state is just a bystander to child rearing by
"natural parents." For the state to examine the fitness of individual birth
parents and to deny some the freedom to take or keep a child in their home
constitutes "intervention," whereas no state intervention in private life
exists when the state refrains from inquiring whether birth parents are
minimally fit to take a child home and raise the child. The second

45

See Wegar, supra note 9, at 363 .
See Dwyer, supra note I, at 410 (stating that the state's "role and responsibility in
family formation and custodial placement of children" is generally overlooked).
46
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mistaken belief is that adults have a moral right to possession of their
biological offspring regardless of whether that is good for a child. 47
The fust belief is mistaken because social parent-child relationships in
fact depend on legal parent-child relationships,48 and obviously the state
creates legal parent-child relationships. 49 Birth parents take their offspring
home from the hospital because a state law confers parental status and
rights of custody on them. 50 Absent that legal conferral of status and
rights, birth parents would have no legal basis for objecting to any other
adult, such as a nurse at the hospital, walking off with the baby at any
time. 51 State laws emanate, of course, from conscious decisions of

47

Cf Denise A. Skinner & Julie K. Kohler, Parental Rights in Diverse Family
Contexts: Current Legal Developments, 51 FAM. REL. 293, 293 (2002) ("[T]he premise of
the fundamental rights of biological parents continues to be a basic tenet of family Jaw.");
Laura Beresh Taylor, Note, C.R.B. v. C. C. and B.C.: Protecting Children's Need for
Stability in Custody Modification Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third Parties,
32 AKRON L. REv. 371, 373 (1999) ("[11he view that biological parents have a natural right
to the custody of their children has endured.").
48
See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 411-12.
49 /d.
50

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45(a)(3) (2007) ("'Lawful custody' means that
custody inherent in the natural parents, that custody awarded by proper authority as
provided in Code Section 15-11-45, or that custody awarded to a parent, guardian, or other
person by a court of competent jurisdiction."); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.08
(LexisNexis 2007) ("[W]ife and husband are the joint natural guardians of their minor
children and ... have equal powers, rights, and duties ....").
51
Cf ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302(A)(l) (2001) ("A person commits custodial
interference if, knowing or having reason to know that the person has no legal right to do
so, the person ... [t]akes, entices or keeps from lawful custody any child ... who is
entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person ...."); Cow. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 18-3-302(2) (West 2008) ("Any person who takes, entices, or decoys away any
child not his own under the age of eighteen years with intent to keep or conceal the child
from his parent or guardian ... commits second degree kidnapping."); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5-45(b)(l)(A) (2007) ("A person commits the offense of interference with custody
when without lawful authority to do so the person: ... [k]nowingly or recklessly takes or
entices any child ... away from the individual who has lawful custody of such child ....");
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4501(2) (2004) ("Every person who willfully: ... [l]eads, takes,
entices away or detains a child under the age of sixteen ( 16) years, with intent to keep or
conceal it from its custodial parent, guardian or other person having lawful care or control
thereof . .. is guilty of kidnapping."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:45(a)(2) (2007) ("Simple
(continued)
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government officials. In every U.S. state, as it happens, such officials have
chosen to confer initial legal parenthood in nearly all cases solely on the
basis of biological parenthood. 52 They do so even though they must be
aware that a significant percentage of birth parents are unfit to parent, as
evidenced by prior adjudications of serious maltreatment of other children
and/or by incapacitation from drug abuse or mental illness. 53 They might
do so because they adhere to some belief about natural rights of biological
parents, but that does not obviate the fact that they are acting and are
making the determinative decisions as to the family life of newborn babies.
That many state legislatures do make one or more narrow exceptions to the
general approach of predicating legal parenthood on biology demonstrates
that they can do otherwise. Examples include denial of legal parent status
to biological fathers of children who are conceived through artificial

kidnapping is ... [t)he intentional taking, enticing or decoying away, for an unlawful
purpose, of any child not his own and under the age of fourteen years, without the consent
of its parent or the person charged with its custody."); Mo. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3503(a) (LexisNexis 2002) ("A person may not, without color of right: (i) forcibly abduct,
take, or carry away a child under the age of[ twelve] years from: l. the home or usual place
of abode of the child; or 2. the custody and control of the child's parent or legal
guardian; ... or (iii) with the intent of depriving the child's parent or legal guardian, or any
person lawfully possessing the child, of the custody, care, and control of the child,
knowingly secrete or harbor a child under the age of [twelve] years. (2) In addition to the
prohibitions provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection, a person may not, by force or
fraud, kidnap, steal, take, or carry away a child under the age of [sixteen] years.").
52
Dwyer, supra note 2, at 859 & n.28.
53
See OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5101:2-35 (Supp. 2007-2008) (listing Ohio regulations
concerning central child abuse registry); 2006 Ohio Legis. Serv. Ann. L-1128 (West) (Ohio
legislation mandating creation of sex abuse registry); Ohio Attorney General, Sexual Civil
Child Abuse Registry, http://www.ag.state.oh.us/citizen/sccar.asp (last visited Oct. 27,
2008); see also HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 587-589 (2008) (requiring birth facility personnel to
report to the local child protection agency a positive drug test in newborns); LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art. 610(G) (Supp. 2008) (requiring physicians to order toxicology tests upon
infants if there is cause to believe that the mother used a controlled substance during
pregnancy and to report positive results); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011-B(l) (Supp.
2007) (requiring health care providers involved in the delivery or care of an infant to report
when they know or reasonably suspect that the infant has been born affected by illegal
substance abuse or suffering from withdrawal symptoms resulting from prenatal drug
exposure); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6386 (West Supp. 2008) (same); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.2-1509(8) (2007) (same).
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insemination of donated sperm54 or through a married woman's extramarital affair. 55
Legislators actually have great freedom in deciding on whom they will
confer legal parenthood. The U.S. Supreme Court has never held as a
constitutional matter that states must always confer initial parentage on
biological parents. 56 At most, the Court has hinted obliquely in dictum that
biological parenthood might constitutionally entitle a person to an
opportunity to demonstrate preparedness to parent. 57 In several cases, the
Court has implied that adults whom the state has found to be unfit to raise
children have no constitutional rights with respect to parentage,58 and the
Court has thus far left states entirely free to define fitness. 59 State
governments have simply chosen to make fitness irrelevant to initial
parentage.
Thus, the current parentage regime reflects an unnecessary,
uncompelled, contingent choice by state actors to force newborn babies
into legal family relationships with birth parents even when the state

54

See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.95(A}-{B) (LexisNexis 2003) ("If a married
woman is the subject of a non-spousal artificial insemination and if her husband consented
to the artificial insemination, the husband shall be treated in law and regarded as the natural
father of a child conceived as a result of the artificial insemination, and a child so conceived
shall be treated in law and regarded as the natural child of the husband .... If a woman is
the subject of a non-spousal artificial insemination, the donor shall not be treated in law or
regarded as the natural father of a child conceived as a result of the artificial insemination,
and a child so conceived shall not be treated in law or regarded as the natural child of the
donor.").
55
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7540 (West 2004) ("Except as provided in Section 7541,
the child of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage."); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 31-11-02(4)
( 1996) ("The following presumptions, and no others, are conclusive: ... The issue of a wife
cohabiting with her husband who is not impotent is presumed indisputably to be
legitimate.").
56
Dwyer, supra note 41 (manuscript at 51).
57
See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) ("The significance of the biological
connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring.").
58
Dwyer, supra note 41 (manuscript at 51-58) (analyzing a series of Supreme Court
cases and explaining why unfit birth parents have no constitutional right to become legal
parents).
59
See id. (manuscript at 57).
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knows that the birth parents are unfit and even when there are other adults
available whom the state has found to be fit to parent and who wish to raise
those babies. This suggests both that things could be otherwise and that
state actors should have good reasons for choosing this regime rather than
another, given that the current regime imposes substantial costs on many
people-namely, on children consigned to the custody of unfit parents and
on adults who wish to raise children not their biological offspring (i.e.,
adoption applicants) but who are denied the opportunity. 60 Once we
recognize that the current regime is contingent, rather than inevitable, and
requires justification, we should feel freer to imagine things being
different.
The second belief-that is, that adults have a moral right to possession
of their biological offspring regardless of whether that is, on the whole and
in the long run, good for a child-is also mistaken or untenable. It is
inconsistent with more general principles concerning the rights that human
beings have in formation of intimate relationships. 61 Common law,
statutory law, and constitutional law governing the formation of every
other type of intimate relationship reflect a principle that neither the state
nor any private party may force a human individual to enter into an
intimate relationship that is contrary to that individual's welfare. 62 In the
case of competent adults forming relationships with each other, the law
instantiates that principle by giving all of them a choice-protecting right to
refuse association with anyone they wish to avoid. 63 In the case of
incompetent adults entering into relationships analogous to the parent-child
relationship-that is, into guardian-ward relationships-the law
instantiates this principle in rules requiring courts to choose a guardian
either in accordance with an advance directive or on the basis of the best
interests of the ward. 64 In the case of parent-child relationships by
adoption, the law instantiates this principle by requiring a court to confer
legal parenthood on a particular adoption applicant based on the child's

60

On the life-long damage that results from abuse and neglect in infancy, see Dwyer,
supra note I, at 415-28.
61
See generally DWYER, supra note 40, at ch. 4 (discussing popular moral attitudes and
political philosophies supporting the plenary rights adults enjoy for intimate relationships).
62
See id. at chs. 3-4.
63
See id. at 70-79.
64
/d. at 82-85.
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best interests.65 This general principle governing state creation of all legal
intimate relationships other than parent-child relationships based on
biology rests on the empirical fact that intimate relationships substantially
impact persons' fundamental interests66 and on the moral belief that the
state should have equal concern for every person's fundamental interests
and should not treat any persons instrumentally, as mere means to serve the
welfare or desires of others. 67
One would actually be hard pressed to find any scholar or morally
serious person who explicitly insists that biological parents have a moral
right to be the legal parents of their offspring even if that is on the whole
bad for the child. Most people likely assume, without giving the matter
much thought, that making biological parents legal parents is always best. 68
Many people seem simply oblivious to, or unmindful of, the plain fact that
some biological parents are demonstrably unfit at the time a child is born.
Those who are aware might think parents are always entitled to prove
themselves redeemed, to be given a new chance with each new child they
produce, regardless of how dysfunctional they have been found in the
past. 69 Such people are likely unaware of how crucially important to a
person's lifelong well being it is to have a positive, nurturing experience in
the first year of life, free from trauma, and to form a secure attachment and
bond with a permanent caregiver. 70 They are, therefore, unaware that the
state harms newborns by sending them, with fingers crossed, to live with

65

See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 882.
See Dwyer, supra note 41 (manuscript at 63-64).
67
See DWYER, supra note 40, at ch. 4.
68
See, e.g., MARY PARKE, CTR. L. & Soc. PoL'Y, ARE MARRIED PARENTS REALLY
BEITER FOR CHILDREN? WHAT RESEARCH SAYS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OFF AMILY STRUCTURE
ON CHILD WELL-BEING 1 (2003), http://www.clasp.org/publications/marriage_brief3_
annotated. pdf.
69
See, e.g., Anne S. Mcintyre, Comment, Isolating Past Unfitness: The Obstacle of In
re Gwynne P.for Incarcerated Parents in Illinois, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 281, 300-01 (2006)
("[T]erminating parental rights based exclusively on repeated incarceration undermines the
state's interest in rehabilitating its citizens ... [because it] discourages thousands of
incarcerated mothers who are trying to reform their lives in order to regain custody of their
children." (citing Brief for Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcerated Mothers et al. as
Amici Curiae at 18, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (Ill. 2005) (No. 98131), 2004 WL
3550557)).
70
See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 415-28.
66
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deeply dysfunctional parents or by placing them in foster care during the
crucial ftrst year of life while the state attempts (rarely successfully with
seriously dysfunctional parents) to rehabilitate the parent. 71 In short, those
who believe existing parentage laws reflect a moral entitlement of
biological parents likely also believe, wrongly, that those laws do not harm
babies.
For someone to claim that birth parents do have such a moral righteven at the expense of a baby's welfare-would be flatly inconsistent with
the general principle just discussed. By way of justification, then, they
would have to argue that the principle does not apply in the case of
biological parents seeking a legal relationship with babies. That might be
so if there is something morally different about state creation of a legal
parent-child relationship between a newborn and birth parents. Perhaps the
interests birth parents have in becoming legal and social parents are greater
than the interests people generally have in forming any other kind of
relationship, such as a marriage, guardianship, or adoptive parenthood. Or
perhaps the interests babies have at stake in avoiding consignment to unftt
parents are less weighty than the interests people generally have in
avoiding bad, harmful relationships. Or perhaps the babies' interests,
regardless of how weighty as an empirical matter relative to those of
biological parents, simply do not matter as much morally.
An empirical supposition that birth parents' interests are factually
weightier than those of babies is utterly implausible. Becoming a parent is
a profound experience for many, but it is likely less so for deeply
dysfunctional people (e.g., people whose lives are dominated by drug
addiction), and even in the best case it is not a fundamental interest in an
objective sense. 72 It is a higher aspiration people have in life, not a need
they have in order to function and pursue any other goals. It is not clearly
a stronger interest than what adults generally have in forming an intimate
partnership. Being a parent or a spouse can be very rewarding, but most
adults can function normally without being either, and many choose not to
become a parent or a spouse. 73 In contrast, babies have the most

71

See id. at 419-24 (explaining how for newborns, maltreatment, foster care, and
disruptions in attachment relationships can cause lifelong difficulties).
72
See JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 90-91 (1998).
73
See Dwyer, supra note 41 (manuscript at 63--64) (discussing how raising a child is
not fundamental or basic to anyone's welfare).
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fundamental, basic, and profound interests at stake in the state's selection
of the adults who will take custody of them, determine the environment in
which they grow up, and control their lives for roughly eighteen years. 74
A moral supposition that babies' interests simply matter less would
amount to saying that babies are of lesser moral status than adults. Some
philosophers have taken this view, maintaining that only "persons" have
"full" moral status, and that human beings are not persons unless and until
they mature into autonomous, rational moral agents. 75 They have generally
not bit the bullet and embraced the unattractive practical implications such
a view might have. I recently completed a book analyzing in great depth
the relative moral status of children and adults, taking into account all the
current general theories about, and criteria of, moral status. I conclude, to
the contrary, that children are of higher moral status than adults, making
their interests more important than like interests of adults. 76 I cannot
rehearse the analysis here, so I will simply point out that the prevailing
view today, in philosophy, law, and popular morality, is that children are
"persons" at least from the moment of birth and are of moral status equal to
that of adults, meaning that their interests count for just as much as like
interests of adults. 77 Thus, if babies have factually weightier interests at
stake in the parentage decision than adults have, the state should be more
concerned to protect the babies than to gratify the adults. A view that birth
parents have a moral right to gratification of their desire to occupy the role
of legal parent, even when this would entail sacrificing fundamental
interests ofbabies, is thus indefensible.
In sum, the current parentage law regime, under which the state makes
biological parents the first legal parents and (with rare exception)
custodians of the child with no regard for fitness, 78 and which supports the
common cultural view of biological parents as "natural parents" and "real

74

See Dwyer, supra note I, at 415-19.
See JAMES G. DWYER, THE SUPERJORITY OF YOUTII: MORAL STATUS AND How WE
TREAT CHILDREN (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 1, on file with Capital University Law
Review).
76
!d. (manuscript at 3).
77
See, e.g., PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 16 (2d ed. 1993) ("The principle that all
humans are equal is now part of the prevailing political and ethical orthodoxy.").
78
Dwyer, supra note 2, at 859 & n.28, 869.
75
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parents,"79 amounts to the state's creating families based on a contingent
rather than inevitable choice. This choice cannot be justified on the
grounds that biological parents are morally entitled to it. It is also
incompatible with a general moral and legal principle that governs
formation of every other type of intimate relationship and violates the
moral right of newborn babies to treatment as moral equals.
It is also extremely unwise from a social policy standpoint. Although
there is administrative simplicity up front in attaching legal parenthood
almost always to biological parenthood, doing so generates enormous
social costs down the road when the state must undertake a lengthy and
cumbersome child protection process and provide remedial services as to
those children whom the state should never have placed into relationships
with birth parents. 8 For these reasons, we should reconsider how we as a
society go about assigning initial legal parenthood and how we understand
the role of adults who raise children who are not their biological offspring.

°

II. REFORMED PARENTAGE LAWS
In The Relationship Rights of Children, I present an extended
normative argument for the position that, in any situation where the state is
making decisions about the basic structure of children's family lives,
children have a moral right to the state's acting solely as an agent or
surrogate for the child. 81 This means that state decision-makers should
strive solely to make for the child the decision that the child would most
likely make if able to choose for himself or herself. Typically this would
amount to choosing on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of the
child's interests. This would make children's legal relationship rights
equivalent to the legal rights that competent adults demand for
themselves-that is, our right to choose for ourselves the relationships that
we believe are best for us. We are not forced to sacrifice our basic welfare
in order to gratify the wishes of other adults who want to be in a

79

See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE. § 3lll.Ol(A)(LexisNexis 2003).
See CHING-TuNG WANG & JOHN HOLTON, PREVENT CHILD ABUSE AM., TOTAL
ESTIMATED COST OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (2007),
http://member. preventchildabuse.org/site/DocServer/cost_analysis.pdf?dociD= 144
(estimating annual national spending of $33.1 billion on direct costs and $70.6 billion on
indirect costs of child abuse and neglect).
81
See DWYER, supra note 40, at 205-06.
80
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relationship with us. Likewise, the state has no business forcing children
to sacrifice their basic welfare in order to gratify the wishes of adults who
want to be in a relationship with them.
In other words, the state, acting through a legislature, a court, or an
executive agency, should act in a fiduciary or proxy role, with a singular
focus on the welfare of the child. The sole reason why it is at all legitimate
for the state to make such momentous decisions for private persons as who
their family members will be is that babies cannot decide for themselves,
yet they need to have families. 82 The state's authority should extend no
further than satisfying that need. The law reflects such an understanding in
the analogous context of guardian appointment for incompetent adults; 83
state laws dictate selection of a guardian solely on the basis of the ward's
best interests, while giving no protection to the desires of any particular
applicant for the guardian position. 84 It should likewise aim to always
create for children the best family arrangement possible, taking into
account all of a child's needs and the practical limits of government
administration.
With this basic orientation in mind, we can think in a new way about
parentage laws-that is, about the regime state legislatures create for
placing newborn babies into families. Let us imagine that we are
legislators pondering what we can do to make it most likely that each
newborn will have the best possible family relationships. Immediately we
recognize that it is not possible to predict how every potential parent,
whether a birth parent or an adoptive parent, will fare in child rearing.
There is a great deal of uncertainty in most cases about how particular
individuals will be in raising particular children. There is also some
indefiniteness to the concept of "best possible family relationships,"
because there are likely many different sorts of parent-child relationships
that are equally conducive to a child's well being. Moreover, we do not
know everything about children's well being, and there can be reasonable
disagreement about how to measure well being or what constitutes well
being. In addition, individualized decision making for all parent-child
relationships is probably not administratively feasible and it is certainly not
politically realistic.

82

Dwyer, supra note 41 (manuscript at 9).
See DWYER, supra note 40, at 82-85.
84
See id.
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Complicating considerations such as these cause some people to throw
up their hands and say it is pointless, perhaps even illegitimate, for the
state to aim for optimal family relationships in choosing for babies. 85 But
that goes too far. Such people do not advocate for complete elimination of
state child protective efforts-for example, intervention to prevent parents
from breaking their children's bones in anger. 86 This suggests that even
they recognize that we do have sufficient confidence as to some aspects of
child welfare and that we do have sufficient confidence in predicting in
some cases that particular individuals will act contrary to a child's welfare
(e.g., if a parent broke a child's leg with a baseball bat yesterday, he or she
is likely to do something harmful again in the future). 87 Humility
regarding our ability to predict the future, our knowledge of children's
welfare, and our practical ability to effectuate our ideals through
government agencies might justifiably lead us to adopt more modest aims
in reformulating parentage laws than we might otherwise. It cannot,
however, justify the state's altogether washing its hands of the
consequences of its selection of legal parents. Some intermediate approach

85

See, e.g., Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A
Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 1037 (1975).
86
See id. at 1008-09.
87
See Dwyer, supra note I, at 426; see also Douglas J. Besharov et al., How We Can
Better Protect Children from Abuse and Neglect, 8 FUTURE CHILD. 120, 120 (1998) ("Fully
48% of the child abuse deaths in 1995 involved children previously known to the
authorities."); id. at 124 ("Data from records reviewed in three cities show that in
Milwaukee, 48% of families investigated for abuse had prior involvement with the child
welfare system; in Washington, D.C., 32% of such families had been previously reported to
protective services; and in New York City, in 43% of families that had been the subject of
an abuse/maltreatment complaint, children were abused or maltreated again while under
city supervision.") (footnotes omitted); Mary B. Lamer et al., Protecting Children from
Abuse and Neglect: Analysis and Recommendations, 8 FUTURE CHILD. 4, 10 (1998) ("A
review of case records from one California county found that 71% of families with
unsubstantiated reports had prior or subsequent reports for child maltreatment."); id. at 11
("[R]ecent efforts suggest that these tools [including records of parents' past child
maltreatment] can help sort cases into low-, medium-, and high-risk groups, which can be
assigned different priority for investigation, services, and CPS oversight. For instance, one
study in Oklahoma found that 57% of families assessed as 'high risk' had another
substantiated incident of abuse or neglect within [eighteen] months, compared with only
15% of those assessed as low risk and 4% of those rated very low risk.").
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is called for, one that aims at least to avoid placing newborn babies in the
care of manifestly unfit parents, and one that gives as much support and
respect to parent-child relationships between biologically unrelated persons
as it does to parent-child relationships between birth parents and offspring.
Such an intermediate approach could allow for a default rule or
presumption that biological parents will become a child's first legal
parents, but allow for deviation from the default and rebuttal of the
presumption by a showing that a biological parent is not fit at the time of
birth and is not likely to become fit within six months. That sort of
showing is precisely what child protection agencies are now routinely
called on to make in termination of parental rights proceedings. 88 Today
such proceedings can be based entirely on risk of future maltreatment, even
before the child at issue has experienced maltreatment, a risk that might be
evidenced by a parent's having previously severely abused or neglected
another child,89 or in some states by a parent's drug addiction, mental
illness, or imprisonment. 90 What I propose is that the laws facilitate an
agency's making such a showing at the time of birth, before a baby has
been damaged by abuse or neglect, and that the legal action in which an
agency makes such a showing be reconceptualized as one to deny first
parenthood rather than to terminate a parent-child relationship. Rather
than placing a baby into a legal relationship with someone who cannot
assume caretaking responsibilities and then initiating lengthy procedures
for terminating that legal relationship,91 forever stigmatizing the baby as a
hand-me-down even when the baby has always been in the home of
alternative caregivers,92 the law should withhold legal parent status in the
first instance from adults who are unfit to raise a child. The state should
instead award initial legal parenthood to adults who can and will be the
child's permanent, nurturing caregivers. It should put those first and
permanent "real parents" on an equal footing with biological parents who
raise their offspring, and it should treat and characterize a child's "real
family" as his or her first and only family. The change would be
principally symbolic, but that symbolic change might go some way toward
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See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 952--66.
See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 461--62.
90
See id. at 463--64.
91
See Dwyer, supra note 41 (manuscript at 10); Dwyer, supra note 2, 952--66.
92
See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
89
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eliminating the negative stigma that currently attaches to non-biological
parent-child relationships.
To illustrate how this proposal would operate, I offer below a barebones version of a model law of initial parenthood. I have elsewhere
advanced a much more elaborate, ideal-world model. 93 Here I just want to
give some concrete sense of the alternative I have in mind for treatment of
newborn "adoption." I do not endeavor to account here for the various
assisted reproduction scenarios that can arise, 94 nor for co-parenting by
same-sex couples,95 but by ignoring these issues I do not mean to stake out
any position as to how the law should deal with them. I also leave out
many necessary subsidiary rules, such as how a court is to identify
biological fathers.
CODE OF EVERYSTATE
TITLE I- FAMILY FORMATION
CHAPTER 1: THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
SUBCHAPTER A: FIRST PARENTS

§ 1001 State Selection of First Parents
Following a child's birth, the state shall register
persons as the first parents of the child, and place the

93

See DWYER, supra note 40, at ch. 8. In my book on children's relationship rights, I
considered from a theoretical perspective what an ideal parentage regime might be. See id.
at 4. At least one critic has dismissed that proposal out of hand as being too impractical or
unfamiliar. See Catherine J. Ross, Book Review, 16 L. & PoL. BooK REv. 975 (2006},
available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/1pbr/reviewslprevious/2006/12/re1ationshiprights-of-children.html. Professor Ross says little to challenge the assumptions or reasoning
of the theory I painstakingly developed; she simply does not like the conclusions that the
theory generates. See id. This misses the point of theoretical normative work, which I
stated in the introduction of the book-namely, to develop an account of what real world
actors should be striving toward even ifthey cannot fully realize it and/or a standard against
which to measure what is lost morally by making concessions to real world exigencies and
human imperfections. See DWYER, supra note 40, at 1-10.
94
See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction
and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 597 (2002) (discussing
various assisted reproduction methods used to achieve pregnancy other than coitus).
95
See, e.g., Michael T. Morley et a!., Developments in Law and Policy: Emerging
Issues in Family Law, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 169, 198-208 (2003) (discussing
developments concerning gay and lesbian parent rights and adoption).
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names of those persons on the child's birth certificate, as
follows:
(1) A birth mother who is able and willing to assume
the full responsibilities of raising a child after recovery
from the birth shall be the child's first legal mother.
(2) A biological father who is able and willing
immediately after the birth to assume the full
responsibilities of raising a child shall be the child's first
legal father.
(3) A birth mother is presumptively unable to assume
the full responsibilities of raising a child if the baby tests
positive at birth for exposure to illegal drugs or alcohol. A
birth mother or biological father is presumptively unable
to assume the full responsibilities of raising a child if she
or he has been found to have abused or neglected a child
within two years preceding the birth; has been
involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility within two
years preceding the birth, is in or about to enter prison, has
been convicted within the year preceding the child's birth
of any felony or any drug offense, or is below the age of
seventeen.
(4) As to any baby whose birth mother does not satisfy
the requirements of paragraph (1) or whose or biological
father does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph (2),
the local child protection agency shall assess whether that
birth mother or biological father is more likely than not to
satisfy those requirements within six months of the baby's
birth.
If so, legal motherhood or fatherhood, as
appropriate, shall be held in abeyance, and shall vest in
that birth mother or biological father if and when she or he
does satisfy those requirements, but if parenthood has not
vested in that person within six months of the baby's birth,
it shall never vest in that person absent a judicial
determination that this would be in the child's best
interests, in light of other available potential parents. If
not, other persons may petition for first parent status at any
time, and a court shall vest first parent status in such
persons when that is in the best interests of the child, in
light of all available alternatives.
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Additional statutory provisions would be needed to spell out who can
initiate agency or court review of a birth mother's or biological father's
ability to assume responsibilities, what responsibilities are relevant and
important (e.g., assumption of custody or provision of co-parenting support
to a custodial parent), what factors are to be considered in determining
likelihood of becoming willing and able to assume responsibilities, and
what factors courts should consider in deciding whose parentage would be
in a given child's best interests. Furthermore, the child protection title of
the code would need an amendment to spell out what a child protection
agency should do if one or both of the biological parents does not become
a legal parent at birth, and in particular what is to happen when neither
biological parent can take custody of the newborn. Ideally, when denial of
legal parentage to both biological parents is likely, the agency should place
the baby in the care and custody of other persons who would like to be the
baby's permanent legal parents-that is, in, what today would be called a
"pre-adoptive placement."96
I emphasize that the above model is meant to be merely suggestive and
that it leaves out many necessary details in the hope that readers will not
dismiss the idea out ofhand because of some detail included or left out, but
will instead respond to the basic idea itself and, if amenable to the basic
idea, suggest refinements of the statutory scheme for effecting it. I would
also emphasize that I have developed extensive theoretical arguments for
the basic idea in other writings, 97 arguments that take into account a vast
empirical literature on child development and parental dysfunction, and I
encourage readers to digest those arguments before reaching a conclusion
as to whether the basic idea is morally defensible.
The proposal offered here is consistent with other currents in legal
scholarship relating to parent-child relationships. One such current is the
strong support among scholars for recognition of social parenting-that is,
hands-on, daily care of a child, as constitutive of "real" parenting and as
deserving of legal protection. 98 Such support is often coupled with the

96

See Dwyer, supra note I, at 438,487.
See generally DWYER, supra note 40; Dwyer, supra note I; Dwyer, supra note 41.
98
See, e.g., Gilbert Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children
to Maintain Relationships With Parent-Like Individuals, 53 Mo. L. REv. 358 (1994); Nancy
D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs
of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459
(continued)
97
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rejection of biological relation as a sole or dominant basis for creating legal
relationships and conferring legal protection on adults' desires as to
custody of, contact with, or control over children. 99 My proposal here
likewise diminishes the importance of biology, but still makes it
presumptively determinative of legal parenthood. It retains some emphasis
on biological parenthood because (a) all else being equal, children in our
society are better off if raised by their biological parents; 100 (b) it is much
more feasible administratively to deploy a default rule in favor of
biological parents and to aim for different parentage only as to babies
whose biological parents are manifestly unfit, rather than attempting a
best-interests assessment among all applicants in every case; 101 and (c) it is

(1990). But see Gregory A. Loken, The New "Extended Family"-"De Facto" Parenthood
and Standing Under Chapter 2, 2001 BYU L. REv. 1045 (2001).
99
See, e.g., Philip F. Schuster II, Constitutional and Family Law Implications of the
Sleeper and Troxel Cases: A Denouement for Oregon's Psychological Parent Statute?, 36
WILLAMETIE L. REv. 549, 572-73 (2000) ("With the emergence of the 'psychological
parent' concept in American jurisprudence has come the realization that caretaker relatives
and others charged with the protection of children are much more than 'colonial'-type
appropriators, trainers, or mere custodial caretakers charged by the regulatory state, as
parens patriae, to care for and discipline the child.... Legal scholars and others began
recognizing that, while the genetic bond of parenthood remains paramount, forfeiture of this
preference may occur where the natural parent abrogates his or her parental responsibility.
When this occurs, the child's best interests may be served by the continuance of a genuine
emotional bond with the primary, nonbiological caretaker."); id. at 576 ("The attributes of a
family relationship, which are constitutionally protected, are present even when the person
acting as 'parent' is not in fact the biological parent. This reality has been given explicit
recognition by the Supreme Court: '[B]iological relationships are not exclusive
determination of the existence of a family .... [T]he importance of the familial relationship,
to the individuals involved and to the society stems from the emotional attachments that
derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a
way of life' through the instruction of children ... as well as from the fact of blood
relationship.' . .. The stronger the emotional bond between the child and the nonbiological
parent, the more compelling the reasons for protecting the substantial and fundamental
liberty interest, or 'opportunity interest,' which is implicated by the reality of relationships
within the marriage family unit." (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816,843-44 (1977))) (footnotes omitted).
100
See, e.g., PARKE, supra note 68, at I.
101
Cf DWYER, supra note 40, at ch. 8 (laying out the intricate structure needed in order
to assess the best interests of the child among all applicants from birth).
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less dramatic a departure from existing practices and therefore more likely
to receive substantial public support. 102 Significantly, the legal system has
increasingly conferred legal protection on "de facto parents" and
"psychological parents" in custody and visitation cases, 103 departing from
the traditional rule of recognizing custody and visitation claims only by
legal parents (and sometimes grandparents).
Another such current is emphasis on the symbolic significance and
psychological impact of legal terminology and conceptual frameworks.
The most prominent example in recent years has been the argument that
same-sex couples must have the opportunity for legal "marriage" rather
than functionally equivalent civil unions in order to realize true social
equality. 104 In the child welfare arena, a significant example is advocacy
for eliminating "custody" terminology in post-divorce decision making
about parents' relationships with children, in favor of "parenting plans." 105
The concept of "custody award" is thought to entail the idea of winner and

102

See, e.g., Loken, supra note 98, at 1047 (urging rejection of a "de facto" parentage
regime); Ross, supra note 93 (criticizing an approach that requires a change from the
present state of the law).
103
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-13-2.5(d) (West 2008) (authorizing courts to
confer custody on a non-parent who has been a de facto custodian when that is in a child's
best interests); Lawrence Schlam, Standing in Third-Party Custody Disputes in Arizona:
Best Interests to Parental Rights-And Shifting the Balance Back Again, 47 ARiz. L. REv.
719 (2005) (discussing numerous court decisions relating to non-parents' right to seek
custody of children).
104
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the
Jurisprudence of Civil Union, 64 ALB. L. REv. 853, 859-60 (2001) ("[M]arriage is a matter
of status, as well as rights and duties. Socially, the married couple has long had a special,
and generally privileged, status in American society. That privileged status remains
reserved for different-sex--presumptively heterosexual--couples; same-sex couples, who
are acknowledged to form similar commitments and families, get another institution which
is presented as marriage without the name. The historically excluded group can easily view
this as second-class citizenship .... "); Toni Lester, Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve:
Will the New Supreme Court Grant Gays the Right to Marry?, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc.
PoL'Y & L. 253, 265 (2006) ("[P]erhaps the most important reason that gay couples prefer
same sex marriage is the symbolic societal recognition that married couples enjoy as they
embark on what they hope will be a journey of mutual emotional and fmancial
interdependence.").
105
See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child
Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 779, 797 n.92 (2006).
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loser, so using it fosters litigation and a focus on parental rights and
interests rather than on the welfare of the child in question. 106 A few states
have recently adopted this approach, dispensing with the traditional
"custody" language in their statutes and requiring parents to submit or
courts to impose a "parenting plan." 107
Attendant to the change in parentage law that I propose, legislators
would also need to revise what is now called adoption law. Legislators
would need to eliminate remnants of the traditional way of thinking that
biological parents are always a child's first parents and any other persons
who raise a child are, at best, adoptive parents. 108 Some changes would be
substantive. For example, adoption laws now generally refer to the right of
biological parents to consent to or veto an adoption, having in mind
situations where biological parents have not previously had their rights
terminated. 109 Under current law, this encompasses both newborn
adoptions and adoptions of older children. 11 Consistent with the revision
of parentage laws to enable other persons to become a child's first parents,
legislators should amend consent provisions in adoption law to refer to
consent or veto by a child's "existing legal parents," who might be the
birth parents but who might instead be biologically unrelated first legal
parents. Biological parents per se would have no statutory power to
authorize or block an adoption; only those who are legal parents at the time
of the adoption petition would have that power. Birth parents who wish to
have others raise their offspring would no longer relinquish parental rights,

°

106

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OFFAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATION
7 (2000).
107
See Brinig, supra note 105, at 797 n.92; see also March, supra note 16, at 104 (urging
elimination of the term "adoption reunion" and substitution of "adoptee-birth mother
contact" or "adoptee-birth father contact").
108
See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.02(A) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2008)
(stating that there are only three types of parent child relationships: birth mother, birth
father, and adoptive parent).
109
See, e.g., id. § 3107.06(A}-(B) (stating that an adoption petition may be granted only
if the minor's mother and father consent in writing); id. § 3107.07(D) (stating that if
parental rights have been terminated, the terminated parent's consent to adoption is not
required).
110
See, e.g., id. § 3107.02(A}-(B) (allowing adoptions for any minor without condition
or for an adult upon meeting certain conditions).
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but rather would simply inform a child welfare agency that they do not
wish to become legal parents.
Other changes might be merely superficial. For example, if any state's
adoption laws refer to terminating the parental rights of "natural parents"
or "biological parents" in order to free a child for adoption, 111 that state's
legislature should amend the laws to refer instead to terminating the rights
of "existing legal parents." That is the current reality today anyway;
"natural parents" have no rights that can be terminated if they never
received legal parent status (e.g., in the case of sperm donors) 112 or ifthey
have already had their legal rights terminated (e.g., through a child
protective proceeding). 113 Conversely, even under current law, existing
parents whose rights need to be terminated before an adoption can proceed
might themselves be adoptive parents; a very small number of children go
through more than one new family adoption. 114
On the other hand, this proposal would not entail any change with
respect to the ability of persons raised by non-biological parents to learn
about and make contact with their birth mother or birth father. 115 The urge
to undertake a search for biological parents 116 would likely diminish, but at
the same time, the search might become easier if de-stigmatizing nonbiological parent-child relationships results in greater openness about the
biological origins of children in those relationships.

111

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-743{1) (2004) (defining an "adoptable
person" as "a person who has not yet been adopted but whose biological parents had their
parental rights terminated").
112
See, e.g., Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
113
See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 954.
114
Cf Pat Wingert & Anna Nemtsova, When Adoption Goes Wrong, NEWSWEEK, Dec.
17, 2007, at 58, 58 ("Reports that a growing number of foreign adoptees were being turned
over to the U.S. foster-care system prompted the Department of Health and Human Services
to order its first national count: [eighty-one] children adopted overseas were relinquished to
officials in [fourteen] states in 2006.").
115
See James Gladstone & Anne Westhues, Adoption Reunions: A New Side to
Intergenerational Family Relationships, 47 FAM. REL. 177, 177-79, 183 (1998) (providing
an analysis and study on the possible results and benefits of adopted persons establishing
contact with birth parents); March, supra note 16, at 99, 103-104 (presenting studies and
suggestions for "adoption reunions").
116
See Sachdev, supra note 18, at 54.
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Though I emphasized, in motivating consideration of a revised
parentage law, the social effects for adoptive parent and child of the
adoption stigma, the model law set forth above would likely have
immediate and substantial practical consequences as well. Though the
proposal still embodies a presumption in favor of biological parents, the
substantive basis and procedures for excluding them from legal parenthood
are much simpler than in the current regime, which should allow for much
quicker permanence for babies born to unfit birth parents. Current law
vests in birth parents legal parenthood 117 and substantial legal protections
against severance of the parent-child relationship.
So-called "child
protective" agencies are very protective of biological parents' supposed
rights to keep "their children." 118 So long as unfit birth parents express
some desire to raise a child, CPS agencies will generally give them at least
a year to try to make themselves minimally capable of caring for a child
because CPS agencies are in most cases legally required to do this. 119 If
states did not make unfit birth parents legal parents in the first place,
however, the substantive and legal protections of a state's child protection
laws simply would not apply to them. CPS would not need to try to
rehabilitate them and then petition for TPR, for it is required to do that
only with persons who are a child's legal parents. 120 Under my proposal,
CPS would initially just assess the prognosis for birth parents who are unfit
at the time of a child's birth, and if its prognosis is negative, its
involvement would end. Then the matter of a child's parentage would be
in the hands of a court deciding among private petitioners for the role
(which could include the birth parents).

117

Dwyer, supra note 2, 859 & n.28, 869.
See Dwyer, supra note 1, at 452-57 (explaining that states almost never place
children in adoptive homes until after the children have been permanently damaged by
maltreatment).
119
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2000) (requiring that states hold permanency hearings no later
than twelve months after a child enters foster care to determine whether the child should be
returned to the parent, or after a state agency provides compelling reasons, whether it is in
the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights); see also Dwyer, supra note 1, at
435-36.
120
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § l4-2-309(a)(iii) (2007) (stating that reasonable efforts
must be used to rehabilitate the parent who is responsible for the abuse or neglect).
118
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III. CONCLUSION
Reconceptualizing non-biological parent-child relationships that begin
at or soon after birth as a child's first family and real family, rather than as
a second-best substitute family, and shifting legal focus in connection with
legal parenthood from the biological connection to whoever a child's first
real caregivers are, would likely help to eliminate the harmful stigmatizing
of what are now called "adoptive parents," "adoptive families," and
"adopted children." 121 Engendering greater respect for adoptive family
should in turn help to remove the shroud of secrecy as to birth parents that
often causes children to suffer. 122 It will never be a good thing to know
that one's birth mother was a drug addict or that one's father was a violent
felon. However, life should be significantly better for children raised by
non-biological parents when society deems those parents their true parents
because it signals to them that their family is equal to any other. These
children will be treated as if birth parent absence from a child's life is
simply an interesting fact about them, like a child's being unusually tall,
having been born overseas, or being allergic to cats. It does no one any
good to make birth parent absence a dominant trope in a child's life.
Further policy questions that warrant consideration include: What
effect would it have on children adopted later in life, after termination of
their legal relationship with "First Parents," to put them in a separate
category from children who enter non-biological parent-child relationships
as newborns? Do later-adopted children now benefit from being in the
same conceptual category as children adopted at birth, such that calling
their adoptive parents "New Parents" rather than "First Parents" would
exacerbate the stigma that attaches to them? What effect would it have on
birth parents' willingness to "relinquish" a child, when they recognize that
they are not prepared to raise the child, if we change their status from
"Terminated Parents" to ''Never Parents"? This paper does not present a
comprehensive policy analysis. My aim is just to induce consideration of
the possibility that children raised by non-biological parents, in general,
might be better off if the legal system conceptualized newborn adoption in
a different way, so as to eliminate the widely-recognized problem of
adoption stigma.

121
122

See Wegar, supra note 9, at 363-64, 366--67.
See Sachdev, supra note 18, at 66.
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